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Interim Governments: Short-Lived 
Institutions for Long-Lasting Peace
Julia Strasheim
After the uprising against President Yanukovych, Ukraine’s opposition convened an in-
terim government to pave the way for elections in May 2014. This year also saw inter-
im governments put in place in the Central African Republic and Thailand. Meanwhile, 
peace talks in South Sudan came to a standstill in October 2014 because parties were un-
able to agree on the role of the prime minister in an interim government. 
Analysis
Interim governments are often installed during peace processes, and policy makers 
tend to portray them as magic bullets that are capable of resolving all forms of violent 
conflict and promoting postconflict democracy. Their record, however, is mixed. This 
is partly because policy makers focus on distributing interim government seats among 
conflict parties. It is just as vital, though, to ensure that interim governments implement 
crucial reforms and integrate civil society in decision-making processes.
  Postconflict interim governments are set up to organize elections, conduct institu-
tional reforms, and facilitate conflict resolution. They are particularly common in 
sub-Saharan Africa, where they have been installed after over 60 percent of armed 
conflicts.
  The record shows that power-sharing interim governments, such as in Liberia, and 
international interim governments, such as in Kosovo, are most successful in ad-
vancing peace and democracy.
  Among the most vital reforms interim governments need to implement is the inte-
gration of the parallel institutions that warring parties maintain during armed con-
flict. As long as parties retain control over military structures or shadow adminis-
trations, they will possess the resources to return to fighting. 
  How interim governments are perceived by the broader public is also important. In-
cluding civil society in decision making, such as when drafting a new electoral law, 
increases the acceptance of reforms.
Keywords: Interim governments, transition, democratization, peace, conflict resolution
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Interim Governments as Tools for Conflict 
Resolution
When promoting peace and democratization in 
societies marked by internal violence, the inter-
national community often calls for the installation 
of interim governments. Interim governments are 
institutions set in place to facilitate the transition 
from an old regime to a new one, organize dem-
ocratic elections, provide venues for conflict res-
olution for the warring parties, and implement 
crucial institutional reforms early on in the peace 
process. They often convene after warring parties 
have signed a peace agreement, but they can al-
so form while fighting is still taking place. Interim 
governments typically cease to function with the 
holding of elections so that a new, “permanent” 
government can take over. Figure 1 shows that in-
terim governments were common in postconflict 
peace processes all over the world between 1989 
and 2012. This has been particularly evident in 
sub-Saharan Africa, where interim governments 
were installed following over 60 percent of armed 
conflicts, including civil wars in Burundi, Libe-
ria, and the Central African Republic (CAR). In-
terim governments were also set up after roughly 
50 percent of armed conflicts in Europe, the Mid-
dle East, South America and Central America as 
well as after about 25 percent of armed conflicts 
in Asia. 
Policy makers, warring parties, and the me-
dia have thus recently started to increasingly por-
tray interim governments as “magic bullets” ca-
pable of resolving all forms of violent conflict. For 
instance, in June 2012 the then US Secretary of 
State, Hillary Clinton, stressed the need to create 
“a fully representative and inclusive interim gov-
ernment which leads to free and fair elections” in 
Syria (The Telegraph 2012). In the final years of Sri 
Lanka’s civil war that ended in 2009, the Libera-
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) demanded the 
creation of an internationally backed interim self-
governing authority, but the government denied 
them such a request. And recently commenting on 
Afghanistan’s current struggle for peace, Foreign 
Policy identified a new interim government even 
as “the only choice left” (Koskinas 2014) for the 
country. Such a cure-all view on interim govern-
ments is, however, somewhat paradoxical. While 
they may help to resolve conflict in some cases, 
they also raise questions regarding the democratic 
legitimacy of and impunity for actors involved in 
the conduct of war: 
• First, interim governments are typically un-
elected and thus democratically illegitimate in-
stitutions that are put in place to promote de-
mocracy, a system that thrives on elections to 
determine its political leaders. Interim govern-
ments have hence also been called “benevolent 
autocrats” (Chesterman 2004).
 
Figure 1: Intrastate Armed Conflicts and Interim Governments, 1989–2012
Source: <www.ucdp.uu.se> for conflict data; own compilation of data for interim governments.
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• Second, interim governments are also regularly 
perceived as bridges to peace and conflict reso-
lution, but they are usually dominated by those 
actors that started the war in the first place. It 
is not rare for the warring parties’ leaders, who 
are often inexperienced in governing a state, to 
exploit their positions in interim governments 
to enrich themselves, instead of generating col-
lective goods for the benefit of all members of 
society. 
Despite these paradoxes, interim governments 
were also frequently put in place in 2014. In 
Ukraine the fall of President Viktor Yanukovych’s 
regime in February after prolonged protests in 
Kiev’s Independence Square brought an interim 
government to power that was ruled by the for-
mer opposition parties. Despite being in place 
until Petro Poroshenko was elected president in 
May 2014, the interim government did not resolve 
Ukraine’s lingering political conflict. In March 
2014, after an internationally unrecognized in-
dependence referendum and a Russian interven-
tion, Russia recognized the Crimean Peninsula as 
a sovereign state. Shortly thereafter, violence esca-
lated into a civil war in Ukraine’s eastern oblasts. 
In the Central African Republic (CAR) a nation-
al transitional council was installed in January 
2014 after a prolonged armed conflict between the 
Séléka coalition and supporters of former presi-
dent Francois Bozizé. Catherine Samba-Panza, the 
mayor of the capital Bangui, became interim pres-
ident. These political changes did not, however, 
resolve the country’s conflict, and United Nations 
(UN) troops were required to take over the peace-
keeping mission in September 2014 in an attempt 
to stop the continued bloodshed. In South Sudan 
the May 2014 peace accord called for the creation 
of an interim government. But peace talks were 
at a standstill as of October 2014 because warring 
party leaders have been unable to agree on inter-
im cabinet positions. And in Thailand the army 
set up a military interim government after over-
throwing Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s 
regime in May 2014. Military rulers have prom-
ised political reforms and democratic elections, 
though they are yet to materialize. 
The record for all of these 2014 interim govern-
ments in promoting sustainable peace and democ-
racy is thus mixed at best. When are interim gov-
ernments instruments for peace and democracy? 
And when do they fail to keep their promises? 
The Institutional Design of Interim 
Governments
Thus far, political science has almost exclusively 
analyzed the institutional designs of interim gov-
ernments by assessing how these bodies add to 
postconflict peace and democracy. This is based 
on an influential typology that identifies which 
political elite actors dominate interim govern-
ments and differentiates between four institution-
al designs: caretaker, revolutionary, power-shar-
ing and international. 
Caretaker interim governments are ruled by the 
incumbent regime’s authoritarian elites. This was 
the case in Angola, for instance, where the incum-
bent People’s Movement for the Liberation of An-
gola (MPLA) were in power during the transition-
al period between the signing of the Bicesse Peace 
Agreement in 1991 and presidential elections in 
1992. The rebels of the National Union for the To-
tal Independence of Angola (UNITA) were not in-
cluded. 
If a regime is defeated by an opposition par-
ty, however, the latter may install a revolutionary 
interim government – as occurred in Libya in 2011. 
There Muammar Gaddafi’s regime was over-
thrown by the rebel-ruled National Transitional 
Council (NTC), which organized elections for the 
General National Congress in July 2012. 
In a power-sharing interim government, incum-
bent and new elites join forces, as was the case af-
ter Liberia’s long-lasting civil war in 2003. And in 
an international interim government, international 
actors (commonly through the lead of the UN) as-
sume political authority for a period of time – an 
example of which is the establishment of the UN 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo at the 
turn of the millennium (Shain and Linz 1995).
The record shows that power-sharing and in-
ternational forms of interim governments (such 
as those in Liberia and Kosovo, respectively) are 
more successful in promoting postconflict peace 
and democratization than are caretaker and rev-
olutionary designs (like those set up in Ango-
la and Libya, respectively), which exclude one of 
the warring factions. This is because, among oth-
er things, interim power sharing offers all relevant 
warring party leaders a position in political office 
and thus assures them that they will not be dom-
inated or marginalized in the peace process. Fur-
thermore, a seat in an interim cabinet or parlia-
ment is at times viewed to be more lucrative than 
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is continuing to fight for political power on the 
battlefield. For instance, Foday Sankoh, leader of 
Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
rebel movement, is said to have signed the 1999 
Lomé Peace Agreement in exchange for the vice 
presidency and control over the national diamond 
trade (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009). Interim rule 
in Sierra Leone ended with elections in May 2002, 
and civil war has not recurred. In Angola, on the 
other hand, UNITA received no seats in the care-
taker interim government and thus had no reason 
to believe that the government could deliver free 
and fair elections. After UNITA’s Jonas Savimbi 
lost to José Eduardo dos Santos of the MPLA in 
the 1992 presidential elections, the rebels remobi-
lized for civil war. 
While power-sharing interim governments can 
thus often lure warring factions into peace by of-
fering certain benefits, international interim gov-
ernments come instead with capacity or coer-
cion. Due to their greater technical knowledge as 
well as financial and human resources, UN inter-
im governments (“transitional administrations”) 
are, in theory, often better equipped than internal-
ly conflictual power-sharing interim governments 
to rebuild state institutions. International interim 
governments also often possess sufficient military 
manpower via peacekeeping missions to ensure 
warring parties comply. For example, internation-
al authority has prevented the recurrence of civil 
war in Bosnia, where the Office of the High Rep-
resentative is allowed to dismiss domestic leaders 
from political office if they are seen to be pursuing 
an ethnonationalist agenda. 
The Bosnian case, however, points to prob-
lematic aspects of international interim rule that 
are often dismissed as illegitimate, undemocratic 
or neocolonial forms of postconflict governance. 
Furthermore, UN administrations typically suffer 
from operational deficiencies such as being very 
slow to deploy and lacking the necessary cultural 
and/or linguistic skills to rule a foreign territory. 
Also, international interim governments are often 
criticized for imposing Western ideas of democ-
racy in postconflict societies in the Global South 
– particularly in cases where reforms are imple-
mented with low levels of local ownership over 
the process. For instance, the UN administration 
established in East Timor in 1999 did not initial-
ly intend assign any executive or legislative pow-
er to the East Timorese political elites. Only in Au-
gust 2000, after political elites protested against 
the lack of influence they had over East Timor’s 
transition to independence, did the UN create the 
East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA) 
– a body that represented the structure of East 
Timor’s government following the cessation of the 
interim government. 
These issues already point to the many chal-
lenges faced by international interim govern-
ments. But power-sharing interim governments 
also have to deal with difficulties. In fact, many 
power-sharing interim regimes installed between 
1989 and 2012 failed to deliver sustainable peace 
and democratization (e.g., the Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo [DRC] and Burundi). Although 
there are many reasons for this, one explanation 
suggests that power-sharing interim governments 
are seen to reward the use of violence with a seat 
in political office, which then motivates formerly 
unarmed groups to take up arms in order to al-
so receive a seat in interim government (Tull and 
Mehler 2005).
Another problem with focusing on power shar-
ing and internationalization as the key reasons for 
interim governments’ success or failure is that 
while these factors may be strong explanations of 
short-term peace, they often cannot explain long-
term, sustainable peace or postconflict democra-
tization. For instance, if power-sharing interim 
governments contribute to peace by offering war-
ring parties interim cabinet seats, what happens 
once elections take place and a new, postinterim 
government takes over? It is likely that the for-
mer interim governors will refuse to accept being 
stripped of political power and relegated to the 
opposition, thus threatening to return to war. This 
was, in fact, what occurred in Cambodia follow-
ing the defeat of Hun Sen, the leader of the Cam-
bodian People’s Party (CPP), by Prince Norodom 
Ranariddh in the 1993 elections. After two years as 
prime minister of the power-sharing, interim Su-
preme National Council, Hun Sen and the CPP re-
fused to accept defeat and forced their way into 
a coalition government with Ranariddh – a move 
made possible by the fact that the CPP had never 
relinquished control of the security services and 
also controlled civil administration structures in 
much of rural Cambodia.
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Institutional Reforms in Interim Governments 
Because of the aforementioned issues, it would be 
fruitful to take into account explanations of the 
success or failure of interim governments that go 
beyond the presence of power sharing or interna-
tional actors. Just as important as the “static” in-
stitutional design of interim governments are the 
“dynamic” features of these governments (i.e., the 
type of reforms that they conduct). The Cambo-
dia example shows how crucially important it is 
to address early on in a peace process the paral-
lel political and military institutions that warring 
parties create or maintain during armed conflict. 
In fact, in most armed conflicts today warring fac-
tions establish more or less institutionalized and 
militarized “shadow governments” in order to ac-
cumulate the resources needed to engage in war. 
Together with nonstatutory rebel armies, these 
parallel structures do not automatically disap-
pear just because, for instance, a peace agreement 
is signed and an interim government is installed. 
Even in cases like Kosovo, where the mass exodus 
of Serbian bureaucratic personnel led to an insti-
tutional vacuum in the formal state structures af-
ter the end of the war, informal Albanian-run par-
allel institutions had long been in place – name-
ly, a shadow government run (for over a decade) 
by the unarmed opposition party, the Democrat-
ic League of Kosovo, and a self-proclaimed inter-
im government run by the Kosovo Liberation Ar-
my (and set up before the UN installed its own in-
terim administration in June 1999). 
Thus during a peace period, interim govern-
ments must promptly look to integrate the parallel 
political and military institutions of warring par-
ties. These institutions enable such factions to re-
main organized and tax a population, which pro-
vides them with finances to purchase weapons in 
the event they lose elections and decide to prevent 
their political elimination by force. In the above-
mentioned case of Angola, for instance, UNITA 
never allowed the MPLA caretaker interim gov-
ernment access to its districts, therefore prevent-
ing electoral registration being carried out in these 
areas. Wherever the interim government tried to 
expand its territorial outreach in UNITA strong-
holds, UNITA rebels attacked and/or kidnapped 
government officials, thus forcing them to cancel 
their electoral registration efforts. When UNITA’s 
Savimbi lost the 1992 elections to the MPLA’s de 
Santos, he was able to quickly regroup his party 
– primarily in the communes and municipalities 
that UNITA had never handed over to the interim 
government. Similarly, in Cambodia the 1991 Par-
is Peace Agreement did not require a strong com-
mitment by the warring parties to disband their 
military structures, but rather only that the fac-
tions agreed to disarm and demobilize before or 
shortly after the elections and to abide by the de-
cisions of the subsequently elected government. 
But these terms were never strongly enforced, and 
the disarmament process was never completed. 
Consequently, not only was Hun Sen able to force 
his way into power despite losing the 1993 elec-
tion, but Khmer Rouge rebels were able to contin-
ue their struggle against Hun Sen’s government 
until 1998. 
In contrast, the reforms implemented in Nepal 
demonstrate how an interim government’s mo-
nopolization of power can increase its impact on 
postconflict peace. During Nepal’s ten-year-long 
civil war, the Maoist rebels controlled up to 75 
percent of the national territory. They used their 
strongholds to set up people’s courts and peo-
ple’s governments, to extract taxes from the ru-
ral population, and to force villagers to provide 
insurgents with food and accommodation. When 
the Maoists signed Nepal’s Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in November 2006, they agreed to dis-
band their parallel structures upon joining the in-
terim institutions. The new inclusive interim par-
liament convened in January 2007, and a complete 
dissolution of the people’s courts and govern-
ments was reported for February the same year. 
Although the subsequent peace process in Nepal 
had and still has to overcome many obstacles (e.g., 
a thorough reform of the country’s security sec-
tor is necessary), the country has thus far not re-
turned to civil war. 
Elite Affairs and More Inclusive Processes
The role of interim governments is not solely to 
affect the behavior and perceptions of the leaders 
of warring parties. Equally important is how they 
engage the broader public, especially civil society 
organizations, in postconflict societies. The inclu-
sion of the public in processes of institutional re-
form (e.g., amending the constitution or drafting 
new electoral laws) can widen the acceptance of 
such reforms and increase their sustainability and 
legitimacy. For those people or groups that have 
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been excluded from a reform process conducted 
by an elite few or marginalized by the decisions 
of interim leaders, violent revolt may become a le-
gitimate strategy to stop or reverse such process-
es and decisions. Therefore, interim governments 
that consult with civil society during reform pro-
cesses are likely to be more successful in contrib-
uting to sustainable peace and durable democrati-
zation than are interim governments that are mere 
elite affairs. 
We can see this, for example, in Afghanistan af-
ter the US-led international intervention in 2001. 
The Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) was put in 
place by the December 2001 Bonn Agreement. 
The AIA, under the guidance of President Hamid 
Karzai, was charged with drafting the country’s 
new post-Taliban constitution and electoral law. 
But although the institutions of the AIA included 
a broad spectrum of Afghanistan’s ethnic and so-
cial groups, the lawmaking process was essential-
ly closed to broader and inclusive public debate. 
The AIA presented the electoral law to the popu-
lation largely as a done deal and was consequent-
ly perceived as mostly serving the interests of the 
interim power brokers. On the contrary, the 2003–
2005 National Transitional Government in Liberia 
allocated posts not only to the former ruling Na-
tional Patriotic Party (NPP) and the rebel groups 
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democra-
cy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Li-
beria (MODEL), but also to other political parties 
and civil society groups. Instead of a rebel lead-
er, Gyude Bryant, a civilian and businessman, was 
named interim president. Even though this consti-
tutes a much more comprehensive and seemingly 
sustainable institutional reform process than that 
in Afghanistan, it also proved difficult for civil so-
ciety members in Liberia to serve both as formal 
representatives in the interim bodies and to per-
form their roles as watchdogs over the political 
process. 
Interim Governments and German Foreign 
Policy
What conclusions can be drawn from the above 
discussion for the interim governments installed 
(and those yet to be convened) in 2014? And what 
recommendations can be made for German and 
international policy makers that are likely to pro-
mote interim governments to help resolve future 
armed conflicts? 
In Ukraine the outbreak of violence may have 
been prevented if the interim government had not 
been presented as a political “clean break” with 
the former regime. An original plan for the transi-
tion of Ukraine proposed by German foreign min-
ister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and his counter-
parts from Poland and France included a power-
sharing interim government of national unity that 
would have been composed of both the opposi-
tion and members of Viktor Yanukovych’s regime. 
Instead, the regime was toppled, and the opposi-
tion’s interim government (attempting to reform 
the civil administration) swiftly dismissed a num-
ber of long-seated bureaucrats and tried to impose 
a bill that aimed to make Ukrainian the sole state 
language – threatening Russian-speaking Ukrai-
nians in the country’s eastern oblasts, which were 
Yanukovych strongholds. A more inclusive tran-
sition process that had better taken into consid-
eration voices from eastern Ukraine would have 
added to national reconciliation. 
The above discussion also shows that pow-
er sharing alone often cannot explain the success 
or failure of interim governments. In South Su-
dan warring party leaders signed a peace accord 
in May 2014. These leaders, however, continue to-
day to fight over cabinet posts, with each warring 
faction stressing its right to lead the interim gov-
ernment. Similarly, the change in the CAR’s staff-
ing policy that came with Catherine Samba-Pan-
za’s appointment as interim president in January 
2014 did not change the situation on the ground: 
violence remains a daily threat in the country. 
Equally important to the question of who runs the 
interim government is what reforms the interim 
government implements. Both Salva Kiir, current 
president of South Sudan, and Catherine Sam-
ba-Panza addressed the UN General Assembly 
in September 2014 to appeal to the member states 
to strengthen the UN peacekeeping operations in 
their respective countries – in part because inter-
im governments require substantial internation-
al support to disarm and demobilize combatants. 
In the CAR the interim government is becoming 
meaningless outside the capital Bangui. It has no 
control of the country’s North, where former pres-
ident Michel Am-Nondokro Djotodia has formed 
a parallel government in the city of Birao. The ex-
perience of Angola (as discussed above) rendered 
a reform process unlikely and impeded the hold-
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ing of elections (as currently planned) in Febru-
ary 2015, not least because electoral registration 
requires control over the national territory. 
Lastly, in Thailand the interim National Coun-
cil for Peace and Order (NCPO) of Prime Minister 
Prayuth Chan-ocha, and then head of the army, 
was criticized in September 2014 in an Amnesty 
International report that accused it of systematic 
human rights violations. The allegations include 
arbitrary arrests and the restriction of freedom of 
expression and assembly. Amnesty Internation-
al claims that such restrictions are unfavorable to 
an inclusive institutional reform process as well as 
national reconciliation. The situation in Thailand 
is that without consulting civil society in the insti-
tutional reform process, Thailand’s interim lead-
ers are risking a hard landing: not only will re-
forms not supported by civil society be unsustain-
able, but an exclusive interim period might pro-
mote further unrest in the country. 
In general, international actors engaged in 
postconflict democracy promotion and peace-
building have in the past often paid much atten-
tion to distributing seats in the interim govern-
ment among political leaders. This is, however, of-
ten not enough to ensure that an interim govern-
ment succeeds in securing long-term peace and 
sustainable democracy. German and internation-
al policy makers should therefore strive to equip 
interim governments with the capacity to com-
plete much-needed reforms before elections take 
place – for instance, by supporting UN peacekeep-
ing missions that can help to disarm and demobi-
lize rebel groups. Furthermore, civil society actors 
and unarmed opposition parties should be given 
stronger roles in interim governments. The exam-
ple of Liberia, however, where such actors have 
even been rewarded with seats in the interim par-
liament, shows that such inclusion may not al-
ways be the best approach. Instead, policy mak-
ers could encourage interim governments to allow 
for public debates and implement transparent re-
form processes by, for example, holding referenda 
on newly drafted constitutions. 
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